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Our aim in this chapter is not to connect an issue in applied ethics to the criminal law, but rather 
to take a nascent, evolving approach to applied ethics, and to see what it might have to say 
about the kinds of questions and positions we find within criminal law theory. 
 The approach we want to apply to the criminal law is that of what we will call ‘Moral 
Uncertainty Theory’. Applied ethics, broadly speaking, concerns what, morally speaking, real 
life agents ought to do in particular real life circumstances. Ordinarily applied ethicists argue 
for the position that they believe to be the moral truth of the matter.1 So, for example, 
Philosopher A writes an article arguing that the correct moral position is that abortion is morally 
permissible, while Philosopher B writes an article arguing that the correct moral position is that 
abortion is morally impermissible.2 
 This is all well and good, and of course a lot of fine philosophical work gets done in 
this way. But it’s also important to remember the applied nature of applied ethics – it is 
supposed to offer guidance to real life agents. Imagine that Jane is unsure about whether or not 
to have an abortion. She thinks it’s probably permissible but is deeply unsure. She reads the 
work of Philosopher A and Philosopher B. This only heightens her sense of uncertainty. She 
gets the chance to speak to Philosopher A. Philosopher A tries to convince Jane that the moral 
truth is that she is permitted to have an abortion. But then Philosopher B tries to convince her 
of the opposite. Jane remains deeply uncertain about what the right course of action is. What 
is Jane to do? 
 This is where Moral Uncertainty Theory comes in. Moral Uncertainty Theory tries to 
advise Jane on what she ought to do given her uncertainty. It starts from the idea that Jane is 
uncertain, and asks what she ought to do given the moral beliefs that she has. Moral Uncertainty 
Theory asks the question that Jane is surely asking herself: what should I do, given that I don’t 
know what I should do? 
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It might be thought that the answer to this question is obvious: Jane should respond by 
doing the objectively morally right thing (Weatherson 2014; Harman 2015). Well, of course 
she should! But Jane needs to know how she ought to act, given what she believes at the time 
when she must decide how to act. And she is uncertain about whether or not some of the courses 
of action open to her are permissible. Perhaps there is another obvious answer to our question: 
Jane should suspend belief about the matter. That is, when we cannot tell with much confidence 
whether or not some course of conduct is permissible, we can simply suspend belief about it.  
However, whatever Jane may decide to believe about competing claims regarding the 
permissibility of abortion, she is in a situation where she will conduct herself in ways that 
reflect a practical stance towards this practice. Suppose that Jane is committed to the view 
that, if a foetus possesses the same moral status as a toddler, she has a stringent responsibility 
not to terminate her pregnancy. Even if she suspends belief about the claims presented by A 
and B, she must adopt a practical stance towards the issue of abortion. For example, if she 
terminates her pregnancy, then given her beliefs, she is taking the practical stance that a foetus 
does not possess the same moral status as a toddler. Adopting the evidently sensible epistemic 
principle to ‘suspend belief until you get more information’ therefore cannot provide a full 
answer to the question of what you should do when you don’t know what to do.  
To capture this, we might distinguish between moral propositions that agents believe 
they have from those that they assume. To assume a moral proposition, as we will understand 
this notion, is for it to play a role in your practical deliberations and to provide you with a 
motivating reason to act in certain ways.  
 Imagine that, after careful reflection, Jane thinks it 60% likely that abortion is 
permissible. Should she then, for the purposes of practical action, assume the proposition that 
she is permitted to have an abortion? Perhaps. Most applied ethics appears to regard this as the 
end of the matter. But some theorists disagree. For example, as Dan Moller argues, if Jane is 
only 60% convinced that abortion is morally permissible, then she has a 40% credence in the 
proposition that abortion is not morally permissible. Imagine that Jane thinks that if abortion is 
impermissible, it is akin to killing a toddler. That means she thinks that if she has an abortion, 
then by her own lights there is a 40% chance she is doing something very seriously morally 
wrong. Moral Uncertainty Theory can take this into account (Moller 2011). 
 We can make a useful, though perhaps imperfect, analogy with empirical uncertainty 
here. Imagine that Jane is uncertain about whether or not there is a child in her currently empty 
swimming pool. If she fills it up, then if there is a child in there, it will drown. Jane thinks there 
is a 40% chance there is a child in her swimming pool. Jane should, of course, take this into 
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account in deciding what to do: there is a 40% chance that she will do something seriously 
objectively morally wrong. But the same is true, according to Jane’s own beliefs, in the abortion 
case.  
When we assess theories of what we ought to do under moral uncertainty, it’s important 
that we don’t criticize them simply because they allow conduct that we think is morally 
forbidden (or forbid conduct that we think is allowed). That type of claim is the type to be 
considered in first-order moral deliberation, when we try to decide what is objectively right 
and wrong, permissible and impermissible. In judging whether a theory of moral decision-
making under uncertainty is plausible, we must instead ask whether it is plausible that ‘given 
this agent’s beliefs, it is reasonable for her to assume x is permissible (or impermissible) when 
choosing what to do.’ 
 In this chapter, we seek to provide an overview of how different approaches to Moral 
Uncertainty Theory might inform various debates and issues within criminal law theory. Our 
discussion will be tentative for three reasons. First, the point of Moral Uncertainty Theory is 
that it cannot on its own provide moral guidance – it seeks to help agents decide what to do 
given their own moral beliefs. So, what Moral Uncertainty Theory ‘has to say’ about issues in 
the criminal law will depend upon what the ‘inputs’ are: what moral views people have, and 
what credence they have in them. Second, there remains debate and controversy about what is 
the right approach within Moral Uncertainty Theory. That is, there is disagreement about how 
we should take into account the various first-order moral beliefs that an agent has in deciding 
what they ought to assume for the purposes of action. The literature is in its infancy (the first 
systematic treatment is Lockhart 2000) and questions, issues, and problems are still emerging. 
Third, Moral Uncertainty Theory applies in the first instance to individual moral agents, 
providing guidance on what they should regard as morally best or morally permissible given 
their moral beliefs. But when we are considering issues of criminal law, we face social 
decisions about how to collectively design shared social institutions. That is, it is not 
immediately clear what the analogue of the individual agent is, or how to represent different 
credences in propositions concerning the moral status of different kinds of conduct when it 
comes to collective decisions. In many ways, our chapter is an exploration of the difficulties 
and complexities of trying to apply this approach to applied ethics to issues within the criminal 
law. 
 We shall proceed as follows. In the following section, we introduce Moral Uncertainty 
Theory in more detail, explaining some different approaches to the questions of what we ought 
to do when we don’t know what to do. In Section III, we look at the criminal justice process, 
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and identify some key actors who might be morally uncertain, and the decisions about which 
they may face moral uncertainty. In Section IV, we focus in on questions about criminalization 
– how can morally uncertain individuals or collectives use Moral Uncertainty Theory when 
deciding how to vote on criminalization matters? In section V, we discuss the issue of how to 
compare the wrongs of impermissible criminalization and impermissible failures to 
criminalize. In Section VI we discuss sentencing. In Section VII we conclude. 
 
II Moral Uncertainty Theory: Approaches and Problems 
It is only recently that philosophers have begun to systematically turn their attention to what 
we ought to do under moral uncertainty.3 Their discussions have, broadly-speaking, addressed 
three questions. The first concerns the validity and the nature of the ought in question. As we 
have phrased it, the question which Moral Uncertainty Theory addresses is what should I do, 
given that I don’t know what I should do? Some have denied that this question makes sense. 
That is, they have denied that there can be an ‘ought’ which is sensitive to our moral beliefs – 
morally speaking, we simply ought to do what we ought to do! (Harman 2015; Weatherson 
2002, 2014). Others believe that there is an ought here, but there is some disagreement about 
what kind of ought it is – a rational ought; a moral ought; a sui generis kind of ought? We’ll 
largely set these controversies aside in this chapter. 
The second question is substantive: what should I do when I don’t know what I should 
do? Here, philosophers have sought to provide theories or frameworks into which agents can 
plug their first order moral beliefs, and emerge with an answer about what they ought to do, 
relative to their moral beliefs. Elsewhere (Barry and Tomlin 2016), we have pleaded for a little 
more precision about exactly what is being asked here. At the first-order moral level, we often 
make important distinctions between what an agent is permitted to do, what she is required to 
do, what would be morally best for her to do, and what she should do all-things-considered. 
All of these first-order moral questions have their moral-belief-relative analogues, and so the 
question ‘what should do given that I don’t know what I should do?’ is underspecified. Our 
own interest, both elsewhere and here, concerns moral permissions, and so our question is: 
‘what am I (or we) permitted to do, given that I (or we) don’t know what I (or we) are permitted 
to do?’ We can call this the question of moral-belief-relative permissibility (MBR 
permissibility). Why focus on permissibility? Well, judgements of impermissibility carry a 
special kind of moral gravity, and impermissible actions attract a special kind of moral blame 
and censure. This focus seems especially important when considering the criminal law. One 
possible response to actions that are impermissible is to attach legal sanctions to them, 
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including criminal punishment. Imposing criminal sanctions is not a response that is ordinarily 
thought to be appropriate when it comes to conduct that is merely morally sub-optimal. And 
when it comes to punishing conduct, we want, first and foremost, to ensure that our 
punishments will be permissible: the philosophical debates about punishment turn on if, when, 
and why it is permissible, not whether it is admirable, or supererogatory. The issue of 
permissibility under uncertainty is, moreover, of special concern when thinking about what 
kinds of conduct to criminalize, how criminal procedure should be designed, which 
punishments are proportionate, and so on. We will canvass three general approaches that have 
been taken to MBR permissibility in the literature below. 
 The final question that philosophers have considered concerns inter-theoretic 
comparisons of value. The issue here is that most approaches to the question of what we are 
MBR permitted to do require us to take into account the recommendations or requirements of 
several moral theories. We can understand a theory as a set of principles from which we can 
derive different moral scores for conduct options. But it isn’t clear that these theories are 
trading in a single ‘currency’, and thus whether they can be compared in the right way. We are 
going to set this issue aside in this chapter.4 However, we think it’s important to remember that 
while the comparisons that must be made are inter-theory, they are intra-agent. That is, the 
individual who is morally uncertain may be able to do the appropriate comparisons 
(presumably she knows how valuable or disvaluable the options are according to the moral 
reasons that generate her uncertainty), even if the moral theories themselves don’t give her the 
resources for doing so.5 
It must be acknowledged at the outset that any talk of the theories that an agent has 
credences in idealizes quite significantly ordinary moral deliberation in a few ways (Unruh 
n.d.). First, agents do not typically think of themselves as torn between two conflicting theories 
when making choices (they may not even have a clear idea of what a moral theory might look 
like). Second, agents are unlikely to articulate their commitments in terms of precise credences 
in rival moral theories.6 Third, agents don’t typically deliberate on the assumption that specific 
theories they have some credence in value different options in some very precise manner 
(assigning a ‘moral score’ to, say, to how the theory treats infringing someone’s property rights 
to help someone else in need of shelter). Still, such idealisation can be illuminating. It is 
common for people to be in conflict about the moral status of different conduct options, and 
their reasons for this can be plausibly represented in terms of competing values to which they 
are drawn (or arguments they find convincing), which in turn can be seen as embodying 
competing theories. And, surely, we do have at least some intuitive idea, when we are feeling 
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conflicted about the moral status of some conduct option (whether it is permissible to eat meat, 
terminate a pregnancy, harshly criticize a colleague on social media), about our level of 
confidence in its permissibility. Finally, we also seem to have some intuitive idea of just how 
bad some conduct would be, according to some values we are committed to or some argument 
we are drawn to. 
 
Three Approaches to MBR Permissibility 
 
My Favorite Theory 
How, then, can we tell whether some course of conduct will be MBR permitted? We will here 
consider three answers to this question. The simplest view, and the view which much applied 
ethics tacitly appears to endorse, is that you should follow a course of conduct which the theory 
in which you have the most confidence deems permissible. That is, once Jane has decided that 
she is 60% confident in a theory which says that she is permitted to have an abortion, then she 
should regard herself as permitted to have an abortion. Ted Lockhart (2000, 42-43) calls this 
the ‘My Favorite Theory’ approach to moral uncertainty. This approach provides consistent 
advice for agents: regard as permissible whatever, according to the theory you have most 
credence in, takes to be permissible. In addition, it does not require the agent to make 
intertheoretic comparisons of value, since she need only pay attention to how one theory—the 
one she has the most credence in— values the conduct options she is considering.7  
 The My Favorite Theory view has been subject to serious criticism (Lockhart 2000; 
Barry and Tomlin 2016; Bykvist 2017). One problem with My Favorite Theory is that it seems 
unduly sensitive to the individuation of moral theories. Say that in our abortion example, Jane 
is 60% confident in the theory that says she is permitted to have an abortion (Theory 1), and 
40% confident in the theory that says she is not (Theory 2). According to My Favorite Theory, 
she is MBR permitted to have an abortion. Now imagine Jane discovers an important 
distinction within the way that the permissibility of abortion could be established. She is unsure 
whether, if it is permitted, it is permitted because the foetus lacks the requisite moral status, or 
because there are circumstances in which we are permitted to kill beings with moral status. She 
is equally confident in each of these views. So, Theory 1 is split into Theory 1a and Theory 1b. 
Jane now has 30% credence in each of these views. Jane’s Favorite theory now turns out to be 
Theory 2, in which she has 40% credence. By splitting Theory 1 into two distinct theories, even 
though her credence in the permissibility of abortion remains constant, it becomes MBR 
impermissible for Jane to have an abortion. However, the basic intuition behind the My 
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Favorite Theory approach might be preserved by shifting from talk of theories to talk of 
options. That is, it might plausibly direct the agent to regard as MBR permissible any conduct 
that is such that she has more credence that it is permissible than that it is impermissible.8 This 
would have the implication in the case above the Jane regards abortion as MBR permissible, 
even though she is unsure just which theory gives the best account of its permissibility.9  
A much deeper worry about the My Favorite Theory approach is that it seems to dismiss 
the idea that moral risk ought to affect what we do, even when the stakes are very high (as they 
are in Jane’s case in the example above.) Imagine an agent faces a moral choice between A and 
B. She has credence in two theories, Theory 1 and Theory 2, and has slightly greater credence 
in Theory 1. Theory 1 says A and B are both permitted. According to My Favorite Theory, the 
agent should then simply choose between A and B, and can do so on non-moral grounds – both 
are MBR permitted. Imagine the agent is personally indifferent between A and B, and so flips 
a coin. According to My Favorite Theory this is fine even if Theory 2, in which the agent has 
almost as much confidence as Theory 1, says that B is a very serious moral wrong akin to 
murder. Surely, when the agent is indifferent between the options, and one carries a high chance 
of being a serious objective moral wrong, then even if this option would confer a significant 
personal benefit to her, she has strong reason to choose the other option.  
 The above argument relies on the My Favorite Theory Approach appearing to deliver 
the wrong verdict about MBR permissibility. It is important to remember that when we consult 
intuitions about these cases, we should not be asking ourselves what we think is objectively 
permissible when it comes to the question of abortion, or even what we think is MBR 
permissible, but rather what the agent who is uncertain should regard as MBR permissible 
given her beliefs. 
 
Expected Moral Value 
The Expected Moral Value approach to Moral Uncertainty Theory addresses what we 
suggested was the principal defect of the My Favorite Theory approach. That is, the Expected 
Moral Value approach takes seriously not only the agent’s credence in various theories, but 
also the moral value (and disvalue) that such theories attach to different conduct options that 
the agent is considering. The Expected Moral Value approach tells us, through judging the 
‘moral score’ of a conduct option according to a theory, multiplying it by our credence in that 
theory and then summing the weighted scores of each option, to pursue the option or options 
with the highest expected moral score (Lockhart 2000; Ross 2006). So to return to our running 
example, suppose that Jane has a 40% credence in Theory 2 according to which abortion is 
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akin to killing a toddler and a 60% credence in Theory 1 according to which abortion is 
permissible. While on the My Favorite Theory approach Jane should assume the view that she 
can permissibly terminate her pregnancy, the Expected Moral Value approach will imply that 
she should regard abortion to be impermissible: the expected moral disvalue of terminating her 
pregnancy is very high, since by her lights she would be taking a 40% of doing the moral 
equivalent of killing a toddler. We wouldn’t ordinarily perform some action that carried a 40% 
chance (or, for that matter, a 20% chance) of being a serious moral wrong (unless moral reasons 
concerning the alternatives rendered that the best of a very bad set of options), even if that 
action would produce a significant personal benefit to us.10  
 One of the appealing features of this approach to moral uncertainty is that it treats the 
requirements of rational choice under moral uncertainty as broadly continuous with those that 
apply under empirical uncertainty. Still, the very features that make this seem a plausible 
approach in some cases lead to counterintuitive implications in others. The central problem 
with the Expected Moral Value approach is that it will always prioritize certainly permissible 
options over possibly permissible options. Imagine that, instead of a 40% credence in Theory 
2 (according to which abortion is a very serious moral wrong), Jane has only a 0.1% credence 
in it. What should she regard as her permissible options in this case? Well, she knows that 
according to one of her theories (Theory 1—the one she has a 99.9% credence in), it is 
permissible either to terminate or to carry to term, while according to the other, more restrictive 
theory, only one of these options is permissible. So, given that each theory will regard carrying 
to term as permissible, while one regards terminating the pregnancy as a serious moral wrong, 
this approach will deliver the verdict that it is MBR impermissible for Jane to have an abortion. 
That is, this approach will often entail that for the purposes of deciding what to do we must act 
in accordance with the most restrictive theory that we have any credence in, even if we have 
very little credence in it, and even if (unlike in our case) the potential moral wrong is not a very 
serious one. We call this a ‘nesting’ case, since one theory (the more restrictive theory) ‘nests’ 
inside the more permissive theory, in that each and every conduct option permitted by the more 
restrictive theory is also permitted by the more permissive theory, while the permissive theory 
allows additional options.  
 Another challenge for the Expected Moral Value approach is posed by what we call 
‘Venn cases’. These are cases in which two (or more) theories agree on the permissibility of a 
limited set of conduct options (making them certainty permissible) but there are other conduct 
options which some of the rival theories regard as permissible but others do not (making them 
possibly permissible, from the agent’s point of view). The Expected Moral Value approach 
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says only the certainly permissible options should be considered MBR permissible. The 
Expected Moral Value approach, however, pays no attention to why a given theory finds some 
conduct permissible, and ignores the possibility that moral theories may care about the 
combination of permissible options. 
 Consider the following example. Richard has thought long and hard about the 
permissibility of suicide. He is certain it is permissible, because he believes that people ought 
to, insofar as is possible, have control over when and how their life ends. Richard knows that 
next week he will face a moral dilemma. He is uncertain as to whether to visit a friend or a 
stranger in hospital, given that visiting the stranger will produce more overall wellbeing. Given 
that he is unsure, Richard will risk a minor moral wrong whoever he visits. However, since he 
is certain that suicide is permissible, the Expected Moral Value approach states that Richard is 
MBR required to kill himself – it is the only certainly permissible option. Much of the appeal 
of the Expected Moral Value approach strategy of always ranking certainly permissible options 
over possibly permissible options appears to rely on the idea that no theory ‘loses out’ when 
an agent’s MBR permissible options are restricted to the options that all the theories endorse 
as permissible. We think, however, that this fails to take into account a potentially important 
additional moral consideration—how the competing moral theories view the range or 
combination of options that are morally permitted, and why they recommend that range of 
options as permissible. Richard, for instance, has no credence in theories that say that suicide 
is morally required. He has credence in theories that value the combination of the options of 
committing suicide or not, and these theories do lose out if his MBR permissible options are 
restricted to the (objectively permissible) option of committing suicide. 
 
Evaluating Option Sets 
In sum, the central problem with the Expected Moral Value approach is that it looks at conduct 
options one by one, and pays no attention to the fact that more permissive moral theories don’t 
only care about the permissibility of individual options, but the range of options open to the 
agent. For example, theories that support pro-choice care about the agent having the choice of 
whether or not to terminate their pregnancy, and Richard cares about having the choice of when 
to die. A MBR requirement not to abort, or to kill oneself in order to avoid risking minor moral 
wrongs, fails to take adequate account of these concerns. 
 An approach to Moral Uncertainty Theory that we have defended seeks to avoid these 
problems by switching the unit of concern from individual conduct options to option sets (Barry 
and Tomlin 2016). Option sets are combinations of options which, if accepted, are all 
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permissible. To take an example from first-order deliberation, imagine that Nina is deciding 
whether to go to the cinema or stay at home tonight. Both of these options are objectively 
permissible, and so her moral option set includes both going to the cinema and staying at home. 
To explain how our approach is distinctive when applied to moral uncertainty, imagine 
that there are basically three conduct options available to an agent – A, B, and C. The Expected 
Moral Value approach asks us to look at A, at B, and at C independently, and then choose the 
option with the best score. Our approach looks at, and evaluates, the different potential option 
sets available to the agent. These include A, B, and C, but also AB, BC, AC, and ABC. What, 
we ask, should the agent regard as her MBR permitted range of options, and our answer to that 
question takes into account both the moral risks of individual conduct options (as the Expected 
Moral Value approach does) but also how the range of options looks. Essentially, we add an 
additional layer of scrutiny to the Expected Moral Value approach by morally evaluating 
combinations of options, and we think it will be sometimes worth accepting a small risk of 
objective impermissibility for a better option set. 
To return to the example of Richard, Richard has three options: visit his friend, visit the 
stranger, or kill himself. These could be combined into different option sets: an option set that 
only includes killing himself, which, if accepted, would mean he is MBR required to do so; an 
option set that gives him a choice between all three options, which, if accepted, would mean 
he is MBR permitted to do any of them; and various combinations of two options. The option 
set that only includes suicide does very well in terms of individual options (no risk of objective 
wrongdoing) but very badly as an option set – it doesn’t give him any other options, and he 
only values the option of suicide when and because it is available alongside the option not to 
commit suicide. We think Richard should be guided toward a different option set, even though 
the other option sets risk objectively impermissible conduct. He is MBR permitted to risk some 
objective wrongdoing.11 
 
III. Uncertainty in the Criminal Law 
Moral uncertainty can occur at many points during the criminal justice process. Consider this, 
somewhat simplified, model of how some particular person ends up being convicted of, and 
punished for, some particular crime. 
I. Voters elect representatives based, in part, on what they (or their parties) have 
conveyed about their beliefs concerning issues around the criminal law. 
II. Elected representatives choose to make Conduct C a crime – Crime C. 
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III. Police officers enforce Crime C, arresting individuals they suspect of Conduct 
C. They arrest Bob. 
IV. Prosecutors decide to prosecute Bob for Crime C. 
V. A jury decides to convict Bob of Crime C. 
VI. A judge sentences Bob, handing down Punishment X for Crime C. 
VII. Prison wardens and officers must carry out Punishment X. 
VIII. A Parole Board decides to release Bob early, before all of Punishment X has 
been completed. 
 
The actors involved in all of these decisions may experience moral uncertainty (as well as 
empirical uncertainty, which, for simplicity we will set aside here). Citizens can be unsure 
about what general approach to the criminal law is the correct one. Legislators can be unsure 
about whether to criminalize Conduct C. Police – as individuals and as institutions – are given 
discretion about what laws they prioritize the enforcement of, and, relatedly, how to allocate 
spending, and may be unsure about which offences to enforce, or which to prioritize. 
Prosecutors are given discretion over whether to press charges, in particular concerning 
whether or not prosecuting the alleged offence would be in the ‘public interest’. They may be 
morally uncertain about what is in the public interest. Judges may be morally uncertain as to 
which of the various punishments they could hand down is morally appropriate. Prison wardens 
may be morally uncertain about whether they are being too harsh, or too lax, on their prisoners. 
The Parole Board may be morally uncertain about whether or not an offender’s behaviour 
warrants early release. 
 In addition, at each of these points, we can distinguish two main ways in which moral 
uncertainty theory might be relevant to the criminal law. First, we can consider moral questions 
that arise within any standing practice of criminal law. That is, judges, lawyers, jurors and 
others involved in the criminal process face practical decisions about what to do, where they 
can be morally uncertain about what to do. For example, a prosecutor must decide whether to 
bring a case; or a judge must decide what sentence to pass. Second, we can consider moral 
questions concerning the design of the criminal justice system itself. For example, we must 
individually and collectively make decisions about what kinds of conduct should be 
criminalized, which punishments can attach to which criminal acts, how criminal process 
should be structured, what evidential standards to employ, and so on.12 These two sets of 
questions are of course related. For example, a juror in a criminal trial may be uncertain about 
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the moral character of the criminal legal process, or about how to act when you believe certain 
aspects of such processes are unjust.  
 
IV. Uncertainty and Criminalization 
Let’s turn to how Moral Uncertainty Theory might be brought to bear on questions concerning 
the design of criminal justice institutions. To sharpen the focus of our discussion, we’ll consider 
the question of what kinds of conduct to criminalize. Note first that there are some important 
differences between the question that faces us here, and the question that is tackled, in general, 
in the Moral Uncertainty Theory literature. The question that Moral Uncertainty Theory is 
typically concerned with is ‘given that I am uncertain, what am I permitted to do?’ When we’re 
thinking about criminalizing some conduct, however, the question is ‘given that we are 
uncertain, what are we permitted to criminalize?’ This involves two important additional 
complexities that the first question does not involve.   
 The first complexity arises from the move from I to we. Sometimes we might be asking a 
question about criminalization under moral uncertainty as an individual – either as an individual 
citizen or legislator – but sometimes we might be asking it as a group – as a legislature, or as a 
society. What would it mean to say that we as a group regard some question regarding 
criminalisation as uncertain? It could refer to the fact that each and every individual comprising 
the group is individually morally uncertain about the conduct. Or it could mean that, while some 
individuals may indeed be morally certain about the issue, there is no strong consensus on it. 
That is, the moral status of the conduct is not treated as morally settled by the group but is instead 
regarded as something about which there is reasonable disagreement.13 This poses important, and 
complex, questions about what theories we should be taking into account, and what credence we 
should assign to them. When, as a society, we debate criminalizing some conduct, should I, as a 
member of society, be trying to figure out what we are permitted to do, given that we are 
uncertain, thereby taking into account the diversity of beliefs concerning the moral status of that 
conduct? Or should I be trying to figure out what legislation to fight for, given that I am uncertain 
about the moral status of some conduct, and so taking into account my beliefs?  
 A second issue prompted by the move from I to we relates specifically to our own preferred 
approach to Moral Uncertainty Theory (Evaluating Option Sets). Recall that our approach is 
concerned that agents should have a range of conduct options. But people who have these kinds 
of concerns about individuals often do not have them, or at least have them in the same way, 
about political institutions. We might be concerned if morality leaves individuals with no space 
to shape their own lives and make their own choices, and it is this kind of concern that can only 
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be incorporated if we focus on option sets instead of individual conduct options. But when we 
ask about whether or not to criminalize some conduct, we ask about what we should do as a 
political community. And as Thomas Nagel memorably put it, ‘institutions, unlike individuals, 
don’t have their own lives to lead’ (Nagel 1991, p.59). So it is unclear whether our particular 
approach to moral uncertainty theory will have much purchase at the institutional level. However, 
it is possible that we ought to allow political communities leeway to shape themselves through 
their criminal law. MBR permissibility, of course, already does this – the society’s moral values 
will shape their criminal law. The question is whether, beyond this, they should have scope to 
choose their criminal laws, beyond the demands of moral-belief-relative morality. Of course, 
decisions about whether to criminalize conduct need to be sensitive to beliefs about the 
importance of individuals having a range of options. After all, criminalization limits the freedom 
of individuals by attaching legal and social consequences to some options. But should we also 
be concerned that the group retains freedom to devise its own criminal laws, and that morality 
must not demand too much of it? 
 The second complexity introduced by considering criminalization is that decisions of 
criminalization involve, essentially, evaluating two kinds of conduct. That is, we need to ask 
ourselves both whether the conduct to be criminalized is morally impermissible and whether our 
criminalizing it is morally permissible. We can be morally uncertain about both. We can be 
uncertain both about whether some conduct is impermissible, and about whether moral 
impermissibility is a necessary condition of criminalization. We can also be uncertain about what 
kind of wrongfulness that matters when deciding whether to criminalize conduct— if the conduct 
is MBR impermissible, is that enough to potentially warrant criminalization, or is it objective 
moral impermissibility that matters here? If some conduct is criminalized on the basis of its MBR 
impermissibility, is that ok, or should we factor in the chance that it might be objectively 
permissible? 
 To illustrate these difficulties, consider again the issue of abortion. Suppose an agent has a 
40% credence in a Theory 1 according to which abortion is impermissible, and a 60% credence 
in a Theory 2 according to which it is permissible. Nevertheless, the agent is certain that we 
should never criminalize conduct that is morally permissible, but holds that it is sometimes 
permissible to criminalize conduct that is morally impermissible. How then should an agent with 
such credences think that law should regard this conduct? Note that this a somewhat different 
question than how the agent should regard the question of the moral permissibility of abortion, 
given her moral uncertainty. Still, if we hold the My Favorite Theory approach, the answer is 
probably straightforward: she shouldn’t regard it as permissible to criminalize abortion since, by 
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the lights of the theory in which she has the highest credence, it is a morally permissible practice 
(so it is a MBR permissible practice, and therefore she should regard it as MBR morally 
impermissible to criminalize the conduct given her belief that it is always impermissible to 
criminalize permissible conduct.)  
 While My Favorite Theory is a controversial view about moral uncertainty, it does seem 
to capture roughly how representative democracies do treat the question of criminalization in 
practice: the majority’s favorite theory (which might not be the theory with the highest average 
credence) wins the day. Unless some measure to criminalize conduct runs up against a 
constitutional provision, a bare majority is often enough to pass legislation that criminalizes 
some conduct. Moreover, there are no formal or informal norms about what kinds, or strengths, 
of beliefs individual legislators ought to have before voting to criminalize some conduct. So as 
long as more than half of them are convinced enough to decide to vote to criminalize the 
conduct, it will be criminalized, regardless of how uncertain various legislators or voters are, 
or what the moral risks are if they incorrect about this. For example, if individual legislators 
vote to criminalize some conduct on a balance-of-probabilities basis, and bills pass on a bare 
majority basis, then the conduct will be criminalized if 51% of legislators have a 51% credence 
in the proposition that the conduct can permissibly be criminalized even if the other 49% of 
legislators have no credence in this proposition at all. Therefore, conduct can be criminalized 
even when the average credence in the permissibility of doing so is 26%. In our view, this 
seems a very good reason to depart from common practice and reject the My Favorite Theory 
approach to criminalization (see further Tomlin 2013).  
 If we apply the Expected Moral Value approach to the question of criminalization things 
are more complex. There are broadly two different approaches we could take to the 
criminalization of conduct under the Expected Moral Value approach. On the first, which we can 
call the two-step approach, we first ask ‘is the conduct MBR permissible?’ and then, second, we 
address the question of criminalization. In the case of abortion, then, this two-step approach 
would first have us ask ‘according to Expected Moral Value theory is abortion MBR permissible 
or MBR impermissible?’ Let’s imagine that, according to Expected Moral Value theory (with a 
given set of inputs), abortion is MBR impermissible. The two-step approach would then have us 
ask ‘given that abortion is MBR impermissible, is criminalizing abortion MBR permissible or 
impermissible?’ If the only relevant question was the MBR moral status of abortion (which it 
surely isn’t), then it would be MBR permissible to criminalize abortion. 
An alternative approach is the one-step approach. According to this approach, we should 
ask directly ‘is criminalizing abortion MBR permissible?’ and then work out the relevant moral 
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scores of criminalizing the conduct and not criminalizing the conduct, including the probabilities 
of abortion turning out to be objectively permissible and impermissible. 
Essentially, this would involve constructing a two-by-two matrix. On one axis we would 
have the decision to be made – criminalize, or don’t criminalize. On the other, we would have 
our moral uncertainty – is abortion permissible or impermissible? 
 One risk is that Theory 1 is correct. If we make abortion legally impermissible, then this 
would involve criminalising a practice that is in fact morally permissible. This would be in 
contravention of our stated principle (which, in this example, the agent is fully confident of), that 
we may only criminalize conduct that is morally impermissible. We would then need to assess 
how serious a wrong the act of criminalizing morally permissible conduct would be. To some 
extent, this will depend on the magnitude of the criminal sanction. Generally, however, 
criminalizing morally permissible conduct would be very seriously wrong indeed, given some of 
the distinctive features of the criminal law. In criminal trials, defendants are faced with the 
prospect of hard treatment: losing their rights, liberties and, in some jurisdictions, even their 
lives. Moreover, by identifying them as ‘criminal offenders’, society expresses an attitude 
towards them – that their conduct is paradigmatically blameworthy – that can be seriously 
damaging to them. Criminal sanctions thus stigmatize the offender and substantially affect the 
way they are treated within their communities. If the criminal law possesses this strong 
expressive function, convicting an agent of a criminal offence when they engage in morally 
permissible conduct may carry a morally relevant cost well above and beyond the cost to the 
person convicted. This is because the agencies that purport to be acting in the name of justice are 
imposing unjust harm. Unjust harm imposed on people through the agency of the state is often 
taken to be of particular moral consequence. Many people care that the state agencies that 
represent them not only bring about desirable end-states, but that they take special precautions 
not to impose unjust harm on individuals through what they do, even when this may lead them 
to allow still greater harms brought about by others (Barry 2005; Enoch 2007; Hosein 2014). 
That is, many people are not morally indifferent to the distinctions between what a state brings 
about directly through its agencies and what it fails to prevent. The idea that someone would be 
criminally sanctioned in the name of justice and under the color of law for acts that are morally 
permissible is deeply disconcerting (Husak 2007; Tomlin 2013). And of course there are other 
significant costs to the population when conduct is wrongly criminalized. Most importantly, it is 
not only those who nevertheless commit the act and are punished who are wronged. At the very 
least, those who would have committed the act but refrain from doing so because of the threat of 
criminal sanction can also be wronged. Plausibly, all those who could have committed the act 
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are wronged – even if they have no desire to perform the act in question, since they are threatened 
with sanction if they do so, even though they ought to be able to perform the act in question. 
How serious this wrong would be would vary from case to case, but in a case featuring our own 
bodies, and our core rights, it would be a very serious wrong indeed.  
 These considerations point towards an important disanalogy between how an individual 
agent reasons about the MBR permissibility of her terminating a pregnancy and how we as 
members of a society reason about whether to criminalize abortion. The individual agent must 
consider how to weigh the moral risk of terminating her pregnancy (insofar as she has some 
credence in a theory according to which abortion is a serious moral wrong) against the costs that 
she and others will face if she carries the foetus to term. However, when we deliberate about 
whether to criminalize abortion, we are considering how to weigh the moral risk of making a 
morally impermissible practice lawful against the costs that we will impermissibly impose on 
others (namely, women who might consider terminating their pregnancies but will be prevented 
from doing so.) Therefore, criminalizing abortion carries huge moral risks, and agents should be 
very wary of proposing it, even if, when they individually deliberate, they come to regard 
abortion as MBR impermissible. 
If Theory 2 is correct, and abortion is objectively impermissible, then one moral risk 
would appear to be in not criminalizing the conduct. It is, however, questionable whether not 
criminalizing objectively impermissible conduct is impermissible, and therefore whether it 
poses a moral risk at all. Criminalization theory is largely concerned with providing an 
account of the conditions under which the criminalization of some conduct is permissible. It 
often proceeds by way of setting up hurdles to criminalization, and criminalization is 
regarded as permissible if and only if it manages to clear all of the hurdles (see, for example, 
Husak 2008). For example, there is extensive debate about how best to characterize the harm 
principle—roughly, that the purpose of the criminal law is to prevent harm— but most 
versions of the harm principle see it as a necessary condition on criminalization (Tomlin 
2014a, Tadros 2011, Edwards 2014). This is of course understandable – given our ever-
proliferating criminal law, politicians and states hardly need to be given reasons to 
criminalize (Husak 2008, ch. 1), and so the focus has been on when criminalization shouldn’t 
occur. But when we come to Moral Uncertainty Theory, the difference between it being 
permissible to criminalize some conduct and it being not only permissible but also required 
becomes very important. That is, if criminalization is merely permissible, then our running 
example is a ‘nesting case’ – if Theory 1 is correct (e.g. abortion is objectively permissible), 
criminalization will be a serious moral wrong; if Theory 2 is correct (e.g. abortion is 
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objectively impermissible), then criminalization and not criminalizing may both be 
permissible. Recall that the Expected Moral Value approach is excessively conservative 
when it comes to risking moral wrongdoing – certainly permissible conduct is always 
favoured to possibly impermissible conduct. This is why the Expected Moral Value approach 
seems destined to say that, where there is any doubt about its permissibility, abortion is 
nearly always MBR impermissible (since carrying to term is almost always permissible). But 
for the same reason, if criminalizing some conduct is, at best, merely permissible according 
to both theories we have credence in, but also carries a risk (however small) of being 
impermissible, while not criminalizing is certainly permissible, then the Expected Moral 
Value approach would say we are MBR required to not criminalize the conduct. 
Because of this kind of case, Moral Uncertainty Theory might play a substantial role in 
shaping the direction of first order moral theorizing about the criminal law. As observed above, 
moral theorizing about the criminal law often takes the form of proposing, defending, and 
examining justificatory hurdles to the permissibility of criminalization (for an extremely 
prominent example, consider the collective title of Joel Feinberg’s four-part classic – The Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law (Feinberg 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988)). But if criminalization is only 
ever, at best, permissible, then the Expected Moral Value approach to criminalization under 
moral uncertainty will only allow criminalization when it is certainly permissible. Things would 
be different, however, if criminalization were, at least sometimes, morally required. In that case, 
we would act impermissibly in failing to criminalize some conduct. This seems plausible with 
respect to certain kinds of conduct. For example, a state that failed to criminalize the killing of 
innocent, non-threatening people would seem to wrong its citizens quite seriously – but we need 
criminal law theory to tell us more about when and why we are required to criminalize. 
If, under Theory 2 (according to which abortion is impermissible), we would act wrongly 
by failing to criminalize abortion, and under Theory 1 (according to which abortion is 
permissible) we would act wrongly by criminalizing abortion, then we do not have a nesting 
case. Instead we have a ‘cross-condemning case,’ in the sense that we risk acting wrongly 
whatever we do. Given this, we must assess the moral disvalue of both options, weight them by 
their subjective probabilities, and see which has the best expected moral score.  
We have already looked at the wrongs of criminalizing abortion should it turn out to be 
objectively morally permissible. What might be the wrongs of not criminalizing abortion if it 
were objectively morally impermissible? Now, one might think that, according to Theory 2, the 
costs of legally permitting conduct that it regards as impermissible would be negligible. After 
all, we don’t think that all behaviour that is morally impermissible (or even seriously wrong) 
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should be subject to criminal sanction—the betrayal of spouses or the failure to deliver on crucial 
promises, even some that we are contractually obliged deliver on, are cases in point. And 
sometimes this seems plausible for all of the reasons mentioned above—the moral risks of 
overcriminalization are typically quite high, whereas the risks of not criminalizing conduct that 
is morally impermissible may not be so great. However, this will not always be the case. More 
specifically, if Theory 2 holds that abortion is akin to murder then it would also regard practices 
that permit abortion to be at least morally comparable to practices which permit murder. Indeed, 
advocates of Theory 2 may plausibly claim that the criminal law is not only expressive in what 
it forbids but in what it permits. And if this is so, then it would attach a great deal of disvalue to 
the option of failing to treat abortion as a criminal offense, unless doing so carries very high 
counter-veiling costs. 
Still, there might still be important disanalogies between murder and the termination of 
pregnancy that could change the calculus even if Theory 2 is correct concerning the moral status 
of abortion. For one thing, there is a great deal of disagreement about abortion, and this might 
prove relevant to the criminalization question, even at the level of objective morality. For 
example, that killing innocent, non-threating adults is forbidden is clearly regarded as settled by 
the society in the way that the practice of abortion is not. This could make a difference to how 
adherents of Theory 2 might judge the wrongfulness of the conduct of those who terminate their 
pregnancies, since those who do terminate their pregnancies do not in all likelihood consider this 
practice wrongful, much less akin to murder. This is where the issue of collective uncertainty 
may become relevant. A theory could take the cost of imposing criminal sanctions on conduct 
that, while impermissible, is the subject of a great deal of moral disagreement to be quite 
substantial. (This might explain why some ethical vegetarians, for example, would regard it as 
impermissible to impose criminal sanctions on meat eaters even though they regard eating meat 
as a serious moral wrong.) 
Our own approach to moral uncertainty, Evaluating Option Sets, would differ from the 
above analysis only in that it would be less likely to regard abortion as MBR impermissible in 
the first place, since, as we observed above, our approach does not always forbid possibly 
permissible options when certainly permissible options are on the table. This is because, at the 
individual level, it is concerned to give full voice to theories that care about choice. However, 
at the state level, the reasoning would likely be very similar to that under the Expected Moral 
Value approach, since these kinds of concerns about moral restrictiveness do not necessarily 
have purchase for institutions. 
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V. Comparing Wrongs 
If an agent is uncertain about the moral status of abortion, and, if she thinks that if abortion 
were definitely impermissible the state would be required to criminalize it, then in deciding 
whether she should regard the criminalization of abortion as MBR permissible she must 
balance the potential wrongs of criminalizing abortion when it should not be, and not 
criminalizing abortion when it should be, in light of the theories in which she has credence. 
We have tried, above, to identify some of the considerations that these theories might regard 
as relevant. But how can we gauge their respective weights? 
 One possible clue is to be found within the prevailing norms of the criminal justice 
system itself (Tomlin 2013). Consider the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ principle, which is the 
so-called ‘Golden Thread’ of English law. In Viscount Sankey’s famous words: ‘Throughout 
the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty 
of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt ... no attempt to whittle it down can be 
entertained’ (quoted in Ashworth 2006, p.83). Insofar as both of the theories in which the agent 
has some credence are committed to this principle, it may provide some guidance as to how 
agents with credence in these theories should weight the respective wrongs of incorrect 
criminalization and incorrect failures to criminalize. Of course, the beyond reasonable doubt 
principle concerns how juries should regard the empirical questions that relate to whether or 
not a defendant acted in a way that was legally prohibited. However, the grounding of this 
principle may be informative in terms of how to weight the moral risks of criminalizing under 
moral uncertainty (see Yaffe, this volume, for further discussion of the beyond reasonable 
doubt principle). 
 The basic thought here is that the beyond reasonable doubt principle suggests that when 
it comes to convicting accused people, we should be very careful not to convict the innocent, 
even if this means letting the guilty go free. Consider William Blackstone’s famous claim, that 
it is better that ten guilty people go free than that one innocent suffer conviction and punishment 
(Blackstone 1765). Why is this so? It is surely because these people have done nothing to 
warrant punishment, and, for all the reasons enumerated above, we must be very careful not to 
inflict punishment on them. 
 If the reasoning underlying the beyond reasonable doubt is principle is correct, then any 
theory that is committed to it will treat punishment as a tool that should be wielded very 
carefully indeed. And this further seems to suggest that it will wield criminalization very 
carefully. After all, being punished for something that is not punishable is not so very different 
from being punished for something you didn’t do. 
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 While the reasoning underlying the beyond reasonable doubt principle can inform the 
way in which we balance the potential wrongs involved in criminalization, there are important 
differences between decisions not to criminalize conduct and decisions not to punish some 
individual for an existing crime. One difference relates to the expressive or declarative 
functions of the criminal law. Even if nobody is ever convicted and punished for Crime X, 
there might be an expressive or declarative value to having it on the statute books. Another 
difference concerns fair warning and reasonable avoidability. That is, those who are convicted 
of crimes they didn’t commit had no reasonable opportunity to avoid conviction. Those who 
are convicted of crimes which should not be crimes potentially did have such an opportunity 
(though how ‘reasonable’ the opportunity is will depend upon the legislation in question and 
the background circumstances of the agent). 
 
VI. Setting Punishments under Uncertainty 
Before concluding, let’s briefly consider some issues concerning the determination of 
punishments under moral uncertainty. Imagine that we are certain that Conduct C should be a 
crime, it is a crime, and Bob has been convicted of it. Bob now stands before the judge, who 
must decide on Bob’s sentence. The sentence will be a combination of two sets of decisions – 
those made by politicians and other political actors who have established the range of sentences 
that the judge can lawfully impose for this crime, and the decision made by the judge in the 
individual case. These actors can be reasonably uncertain both about the general principles that 
ought to govern sentencing, and about how those principles apply to a particular kind of 
conduct, or the individual case.14 Here, we must balance the risks of overpunishing against the 
risks of underpunishing. One possible analysis of this balance again draws on the beyond 
reasonable doubt principle: that principle appears to emerge from balancing failure to deliver 
warranted punishment against delivering unwarranted punishment. Overpunishment is a form 
of unwarranted punishment, underpunishment a failure to deliver warranted punishment. If the 
reasoning underlying the beyond reasonable doubt principle can inform sentencing decisions, 
it suggests that punishments at the lower end of the spectrum being considered should be 
preferred (Tomlin 2014b). 
 However, things are potentially trickier when the criminal prohibition in question is 
one that passed despite deep reservations of those supporting it.  For example, imagine a society 
has a long debate about whether to introduce a ‘good Samaritan’ law, one which criminalizes 
the conduct of failing to assist others in cases of easy, non-costly rescue. In the end, the 
legislature decides that it will establish the good Samaritan law. They then must decide what 
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sentences can be handed out to those that breach this law. This raises two interesting issues – 
one of first-order morality, the other of Moral Uncertainty Theory. First, should the society’s 
uncertainty and disagreement about the status of some law be taken into account in establishing 
the morally appropriate sentence for breaches of that law? The answer seems to depend on big 
questions concerning the point of criminal law and punishment, and we don’t have space to do 
more than raise them here. For example, if we are straight-up retributivists, then the correct 
punishment will reflect the moral gravity of the act – that society is unsure about whether or 
not to criminalize the conduct is neither here nor there. Either it warrants criminalization and 
punishment, or it doesn’t. On the other hand, more expressive or communitarian-oriented 
theories might see things differently: if sentencing is a form of communal sanction, it seems 
plausible that the sentence attached to the crime should reflect the unease with which the 
society introduced the legislation. 
At the level of Moral Uncertainty Theory, we can also ask whether the uncertainty with 
which the society introduced the legislation should affect sentencing calculations. Essentially, 
when an agent is uncertain about attaching a sentence, we need to take account of all the 
different sentences that different moral theories would endorse. Let’s say that when the good 
Samaritan law is introduced, a member of the Sentencing Commission is torn as to whether 
failures to assist in cases of easy, non-costly rescue are significantly less seriously wrong than 
murder (say, on the general ground that doing harm is much worse than allowing harm to occur, 
all else being held equal), or are morally equivalent to unlawfully killing innocent, non-
threatening people. Therefore, she is unsure as to whether a sentence of 1 or 8 years is 
appropriate. In deciding what sentence to recommend, she must balance the moral risks of 
over- and under-punishment. But let’s say that she, like the wider society, was also deeply 
conflicted about whether to introduce the legislation at all. That means that she also thinks that 
it is possible that such failures to rescue should not be criminally sanctioned at all. Should this 
be taken into account? If so, a one year sentence also risks over-punishment. If not, a one year 
sentence carries no risk of wrongdoing at all. Should sentencing under moral uncertainty 
proceed as if criminalization is warranted – it only remains to be seen what sentence to attach, 
or should it reflect the uncertainty with which legislation was introduced? 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has explored how we should approach moral questions concerning the criminal 
law – in particular what conduct we can or should criminalize, and what sentences we can or 
should attach to criminal conduct – under moral uncertainty. Criminal law theory is hard, and 
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so we are often, and often should be, reasonably uncertain about what the morally right answers 
are concerning how the criminal law should be structured. And of course the stakes attaching 
to how we resolve these questions are very high – the criminal law, and the conduct it often 
responds to, can wreak havoc in people’s lives, innocent and guilty alike. Using the criminal 
law inappropriately can have disastrous consequences. Failing to use it when we could do so 
fairly and effectively can also be a grave moral wrong. 
 Moral Uncertainty Theory is a growing area of applied ethics that seeks to help us to 
decide what to do when we are morally uncertain. However, we have seen here is that it is not 
easy to apply it to the criminal law. Moral Uncertainty Theory ordinarily deals with questions 
concerning individual morality.  We’ve seen that when we try to apply it to questions of how 
collectively we should respond to breaches of inter-personal morality, things rapidly become 
complex. That is why this chapter perhaps raises more questions than it answers. 
 Nevertheless, we think Moral Uncertainty Theory holds promise for informing our 
thinking some of the most pressing questions in criminal law theory. For example, is it good 
enough that we always act on the theory in which we have the most confidence? Shouldn’t we 
take account of the potential wrongs we will do if we criminalize conduct that ought to be 
legal? If we should, we have other questions to answer: What would those wrongs be, and how 
serious would they be? Is the state only ever permitted to criminalize conduct, or is it, at least 
sometimes, required? If it is required, when it is so required? What are the wrongs of the state 
failing to criminalize conduct it should have criminalized? How significant are they compared 
with those of incorrect criminalization? And, once conduct is criminalized, how should we 





Ashworth, Andrew. Principles of Criminal Law, Fifth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006. 
 
Barry, Christian. “Applying the Contribution Principle,” Metaphilosophy, 36 (2005): 210–27/ 
 
Barry, Christian, and Tomlin, Patrick. “Moral Uncertainty and Permissibility: Evaluating 
Option Sets,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2016): 898-923. 
 
 23 
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1765–69. 
 
Bykvist, Krister. “Moral Uncertainty,” Philosophy Compass 12 (2017). 
 
Edwards, James. “Harm Principles,” Legal Theory 20 (2014): 253-285. 
Feinberg, Joel. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 1, Harm to Others. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984. 
Feinberg, Joel. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 2, Offense to Others. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Feinberg, Joel. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 3, Harm to Self. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Feinberg, Joel. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 4, Harmless Wrongdoing. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
Feinberg, Joel. “The Expressive Function of Punishment.” In 
Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, edited by Joel Feinberg. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970: 95–118 
 
Guerrero, Alex. “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability and Caution.” 
Philosophical Studies 136 (2007): 59–97. 
 
Gustafsson, Johan E., and Torpman, Olle. “In Defence of My Favorite Theory.” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2014): 159–174. 
 
Harman, Elizabeth. “The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 
Vol. X., edited by R. Shafer-Landau. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
 
Husak, Douglas. Overcriminalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 




Jackson, Frank, and Smith, Michael. “Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty,” Journal of 
Philosophy 103 (2006): 267–283. 
 
Lockhart, Ted. “A Decision-Theoretic Reconstruction of Roe V. Wade,” Public Affairs 
Quarterly 5 (1991): 243-258. 
 
Lockhart, Ted. Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000. 
 
MacAskill, William. “Moral Uncertainty as a Voting Problem,” Mind 125 (2016): 967-1004. 
 
MacAskill, William, and Ord, Toby. “Why Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness,” Noûs 
(forthcoming). 
 
Moller, Dan. “Abortion and Moral Risk,” Philosophy 86 (2011): 425-443. 
 
Nagel, Thomas. Equality and Partiality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
 
Ross, Jacob. “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism,” Ethics 116 (2006): 742–768. 
 
Sepielli, Andrew. “Review: Ted Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences,” Ethics 
116 (2006): 601–604. 
 
Sepielli, Andrew. “What to Do When You Don’t Know What to Do.” In Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, vol. 4, edited by R. Schafer-Landau. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Sepielli, Andew. “Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists,” Philosophical Studies 160 
(2012): 191-207. 
 
Sepielli, Andrew. “Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity among Moral Theories,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2013a): 580-589. 
 
Sepielli, Andrew. “What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do When You Don't Know 
What to Do...,” Nous 47 (2013b): 521-544. 
 25 
 
Sepielli, Andrew. “Moral Uncertainty.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online. 
(forthcoming). 
 
Tadros, Victor. “Harm. Sovereignty, and Prohibition,” Legal Theory 17 (2011): 35-65. 
 
Tomlin, Patrick. “Extending the Golden Thread? Criminalisation and the Presumption of 
Innocence,” Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2013): 44–66. 
 
Tomlin, Patrick. “Retributivists! The Harm Principle is not for you!” Ethics 124 (2014a): 
272-298. 
 
Tomlin, Patrick. “Could the Presumption of Innocence Protect the Guilty?”, Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 8 (2014b): 431-447. 
 
Unruh, Charlotte. “Moral Uncertainty as a Real-World Problem,” Unpublished m.s. 
 
Weatherson, Brian. “Review: Ted Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences,” Mind 
111 (2002): 693–696. 
 
Weatherson, Brian. “Running risks morally,” Philosophical Studies 167 (2014).: 141–163. 
 
Yaffe, Gideon. “When Does Evidence Support Beyond Reasonable Doubt?” This Volume. 
 
 We are grateful to Vincent Chiao and Kim Ferzan for written comments on earlier versions of this chapter. 
1 For the purposes of this essay, we will not make any assumptions about the status of ethical claims. We will 
sometimes speak of moral claims or principles being ‘objective’, ‘right,’ ‘correct’ or ‘true’, but could rephrase 
these claims in terms more friendly to anti-realists (e.g., as the moral claims or principles to which the agent 
should commit herself). On moral uncertainty and non-cognitivism, see Sepielli 2012. 
2 Abortion is an issue that many writers on moral uncertainty have focused on (see, for example, Lockhart, 
1991, 2000, Guerrero 2007, Moller 2010, Weatherson 2014, Barry and Tomlin 2016), and of course its moral 
and legal status remain the subject of heated disagreement, so we will use it as our running example throughout 
this chapter.  
3 For a very useful overview of the debates, see Bykvist 2017. Some distinctive contributions to the literature 
include: Ross 2006; Moller, 2011; Jackson and Smith 2006; Guerrero 2007; Lockhart 2000; Sepielli 2006, 2009; 
Weatherson 2002; MacAskill 2016; Barry and Tomlin 2016; Gustafsson and Torpman 2014; MacAskill and 
Ord, forthcoming. 
4 For discussion see: Bykvist 2017, Lockhart 2000, ch.2, Gustafsson and Torpman 2014, Hedden, 2016, Ross, 
2006; Sepielli, 2009. 
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5 We are grateful for useful correspondence with Peter Vallentyne on this issue. This is not to say, of course, 
that the typical moral agent will actually engage in such deliberations. 
6 Indeed, any attempt to do so might be implausible. It seems plausible that our credences in theories, as in many 
other propositions, are rather imprecise or indeterminate. 
7 Gustafsson and Torpman regard this as a principal advantage of the MFT approach. Gustafsson and Torpman 
2014, p.60. 
8 MacAskill and Ord refer to this as the ‘My Favorite Option’ approach. MacAskill and Ord, forthcoming, pp.9-
10. 
9 For a more extended response to these worries about individuation see Gutafsson and Torpman 2014, pp. 171-
2. 
10 This approach assumes, which the My Favorite Theory approach does not, that we can indeed make 
meaningful comparisons across theories in terms of how much they value various options.  
11 For criticism of our approach, see Ord and MacAskill, forthcoming. The main issue they identify is ‘double 
counting’ of demandingness or restrictiveness concerns. Our reply to this is outlined at Barry and Tomlin 2016, 
pp. 916-7. 
12 Some of the decisions we must make concern epistemic issues. We must, for example, consider whether 
ignorance of the law or uncertainty about what it requires can serve as an excuse for criminal acts. See Husak, 
this volume, for discussion of this issue. This type of uncertainty, about the law’s requirements, is distinct from 
the uncertainty that we are focusing on here, which concerns what laws we ought to make. 
13 That the morality of some conduct is considered to be settled by a group is consistent with the fact that some 
people choose nonetheless to engage in that conduct—the killing of innocent, non-threatening people is an 
example. 
14 Our question here concerns how the moral uncertainty of those deciding the sentence should influence their 
decision. A further, potentially relevant, source of uncertainty is from the convicted party themselves – should 
the offender’s legal or moral ignorance or uncertainty affect sentencing? On this issue, see Husak (this volume). 
Of course, those deciding the sentence may be uncertain over how to handle the offender’s uncertainty, and this 
may influence their decision 
